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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICE, MELBY ENTERPRISES, INC. , 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of 
ilie State of Utah, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 17525 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case involves an action brought by plaintiff-appellant 
(Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc.) against defendant-respondent 
(Salt Lake County) to rescind a contract for the sale and purchase 
of land entered into more than ten (10) years ago because of 
purported duress and misrepresentation. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court for Salt Lake County granted defendant's 
Motion for Surrnnary Judgment, and, on December 29, 1980, entered a 
Summary Judgment of non-liability dismissing plaintiff's complaint 
with prejudice and on the merits. (R. 47-49) Plaintiff appealed. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of dismissal of 
appellant's complaint made by the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While appellant's statement of facts portrays a general 
scenario of what took place, it is slanted heavily in appellant'; 
favor and reeks of a seller's belated remorse in having sold its 
property. Respondent accordingly elects to make its own state-
ment of facts. 
The land sale contract which is the subject matter of this 
appeal was entered into more than ten (10) years ago on 
September 20, 1970. (R. 15-20) The land sold by appellant a~ 
purchased by respondent pursuant to that contract was acquired be 
Salt Lake County for the expansion of the Big Cottonwood Park. 
The agreed upon consideration set forth in the contract was 
timely paid, and, on February 27, 1973, the property was conveyec 
to the County by Warranty Deed duly recorded in the Office of thi 
County Recorder. 
The thrust of appellant's claim to vitiate the more than te: 
year old contract is purported duress and misrepresentation. The 
purported duress is the assertion that at the time the contract 
was entered into, respondent's agent told appellant that unless 
appellant voluntarily sold respondent the property which respond,: 
was endeavoring to acquire for the expansion of the park, 
respondent would institute condemnation proceedings to acquire I 
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r 
agent purportedly told appellant at the time the contract was 
entered into that the property would be developed into a public 
park. 
The Big Cottonwood Park for which the property was acquired 
has not been fully developed. The primary reason being the 
defeat of the County Recreation Bond Election on August 13, 1974. 
Had that bond election been successful, the County would not only 
have been able to complete the development of the Big Cottonwood 
Park, which was one of the specific items set forth in the bond 
election issue, but, the County also would have been able to 
acquire and develop many other recreational sites and facilities. 
The above are the basic facts giving rise to appellant's 
claim for rescission of the land sale contract for purported 
fraud and misrepresentation. Where additional facts are deemed 
necessary, they will be set forth in the brief to support the 
points argued by respondent. Respondent's argument will follow 
chronologically the points and argument made by appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TORT CLAIM OF DURESS AND/OR MISREPRE-
SENTATION WHICH APPELLANT ASSERTED AGAINST 
RESPONDENT MUST FAIL UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY. HOWEVER, EVEN IF 
RESPONDENT'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY BE DEEMED 
WAIVED, APPELLANT STILL CANNOT PREVAIL 
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MAN-
DATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT. 
In Point I appellant endeavors to overcome its admitted 
failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Act which respondent interposed as one of several 
-3-
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defenses to appellant's tort claim against respondent (R. 8-9) b·. 
stating on page 4 of its brief: 
" ... any contract inherently carries with it 
the contractual right to seek a remedy for 
fraud, misrepresentation, or duress regard-
less of whether said remedy is expressly 
provided for in the contract .... " (Emphasis 
supplied) 
Appellant cites the case of Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 in 
support of the above quoted assertion; and, on page 4 of its 
brief then says: 
" ... The Corporation's cause of action does, 
therefore, arise out of a contractual right; 
consequently 63-30-5 waives governmental 
immunity, the notice requirements under 
63-30-12, 63-30-13, and the undertaking 
requirement of 63-30-19." 
Neither Lamb v. Bangart nor any other case respondent knows 
of says or implies that because fraud, misrepresentation or 
duress, under certain circumstances, may possibly vitiate a 
contract, that therefore fraud, misrepresentation or duress is a 
contractual right upon which a suit against a governmental entity 
may be based, since, as to contracts, governmental immunity has 
been waived. Horn book law teaches that fraud, misrepresentation 
and duress sound in tort--not in contract. How respondent can 
reach such a twisted, tortured interpretation of the language in 
the Lamb v. Bangart decision is beyond respondent. 
The analyses as to the governmental immunity defenses which 
were asserted by respondent, and which were considered by the 
lower court are set forth in respondent's memoranda which are 
part of this record on appeal so they will not be repeated. (See 
R. 25-27 and R. 41-43) 
-4-
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The concluding statement made by appellant on page 5 of its 
/ Jrief in support of its Point I that: -- "The County, by choosing 
: to purchase the property by contract rather than condemn it, 
I 
I waived its immunity" -- simply doesn't follow. Appellant by 
i suing respondent for purported duress and misrepresentation was 
: suing in tort and not on the contract. It necessarily follows 
: then that even if governmental immunity was waived, appellant 
would still have had to comply with the other mandatory pro-
visions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which appellant did 
not do. 
POINT II 
A SO-CALLED THREAT OF CONDEMNATION IS NOT 
SUCH LEGAL DURESS AS TO INVALIDATE AN OTHER-
WISE VALID LAND ACQUISITION CONTRACT ENTERED 
INTO BY A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY. 
Appellant, in its endeavor to invalidate the land contract 
it entered into with respondent, and, in support of Point II of 
its brief says on page 5 of its brief: 
"The contract in the case at bar was induced 
by duress .... " 
The only duress referred to was the purported threat of condemna-
tion made by respondent. Then on page 6 of its brief appellant 
says: 
"Because the County threatened condemnation 
when it was not disposed to do so, the 
Corporation seeks to rescind the contract 
under the theory of duress." 
Appellant cites no authority for the above assertion. 
Furthermore, respondent questions that any such authority can be 
found. With reference to what does in fact constitute actionable 
-5-
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duress, the Utah Supreme Court in Fox v. Piercey, 227 P. 2d 763, 
at page 766 said: 
" ... under all the authorities, ancient and 
modern, the act or threat constituting duress 
must be wrongful." 
Assuming that condemnation was threatened if respondent was 
unable to acquire the property voluntarily, is there anything 
wrongful with that? It is submitted that it is the usual and 
customary practice for all public entities who need private 
property for a public purpose to first try to acquire the 
property voluntarily, and, if this cannot be done, then infom 
the owner that condemnation proceedings will be instituted to 
acquire it. Since in this case the property was in fact acqu~~ 
voluntarily without condemnation, why would condemnation be 
resorted to so as to subject appellant to the considerable 
additional expenditure of time and money necessarily incurred in 
any condemnation proceeding? The mere statement of such a 
useless action demonstrates its nonsense. Furthermore, such a 
novel doctrine would be dangerous and leave land titles in 
considerable doubt. It would mean that whenever a public entity 
acquired property for a public purpose, it would have to conde~ 
because, if it did not condemn, any voluntary acquisition without 
condemnation would be voidable since it could always therafter be 
said that threats of condemnation were made. Such a doctrine 
would upset more than seventy-five per cent (7 570) of the property 
acquisitions made by the various public entities in the United 
States. The mere threat of condemnation simply does not 
-6-
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Finally, even if the claimed threat of condemnation should 
I Je construed as duress legally sufficient to invalidate an other-
:ilse valid contract, appellant still could not prevail. This for 
the reason it would have to have occurred before or at the time 
the contract was signed. In this case, that was more than ten 
1ears ago. Accordingly, appellant's claimed duress would long 
ago have been barred by the statute of limitations. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CLAIMED PROMISSORY MISREPRE-
SENTATION IS NOT THE KIND OF MISREPRESEN-
TATION WHICH IS ACTIONABLE UNDER PREVAILING 
UTAH LAW. 
I Appellant's claim of misrepresentation by respondent is not 
I 
that respondent made a statement of a material fact which was 
1 
false and known to be false, and, which was relied upon by 
I appellant to appellant's damage. The claimed misrepresentation 
ls simply that respondent promised appellant it would develop the 
property it acquired from appellant as a park within a reasonable 
time. 
Even though it is conceded that the property in question has 
not yet been fully developed as part of the Big Cottonwood Park, 
attention is invited to the fact that appellant does not allege 
in its complaint that when the claimed promissory representation 
as aforesaid was made, respondent did not intend to carry out 
that representation. It is this deficiency in pleadings, among 
other deficiencies, which makes appellant's complaint fatally 
rlefective. 
-7-
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The case of Nielson v. Leamington Mines & Exploration 
Corporation, 48 P.2d 438, involved a situation similar to the one 
in the above case. It was an action to set aside a deed to 
certain mining claims purportedly induced by false and fraudulent 
representations. The lower court found for plaintiff and set 
aside the deed. However, that ruling was reversed on appeal. In 
its decision the Utah Supreme Court set forth the following 
principles as those governing cases involving fraudulent repre-
sentations. At page 441 of the opinion the court said: 
"In the case of Campbell v. Zion's Co-op 
Horne, etc., Co., 46 Utah 1, 148 P. 401, 406, 
this court announced the principles governing 
cases involving fraudulent representations by 
quoting and approving the following language 
from Southern Develo~rnent Co. v. Silva, ~25 
U.S. 247, 8 S. Ct. 8 1, 31 L. Ed. 678: In 
order to establish a charge of this character 
the complainant must show by clear and 
decisive proof: First, that the defendant 
has made a representation in regard to a 
material fact; secondly, that such repre-
sentation is false; thirdly, that such 
representation was not actually believed by 
the defendant, on reasonable grounds, to be 
true; fourthly, that it was made with intent 
that it should be acted on; fifthly, that it 
was acted on by complainant to his damage; 
and, sixthly, that in so acting on it the 
complainant was ignorant of its falsity, and 
reasonably believed it to be true. The first 
of the foregoing requisites excludes such 
statements as consist merely in the expression 
of opinion or judgment, honestly entertained; .... " 
While Nielson v. Leamington Mines & Exploration Corporat~, 
supra, typifies the usual fraud case, Utah does, however, re~g~~ 
that an action for fraud may also be predicated on a promise 
accompanied by a present intention not to perform. In setting 
aside the dismissal of a fraud action based on a promise to do 
-8- i 
_.... 
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, 0rnething in the future, this court in Hull v. Flinders, 27 P.2d 
i6 said at page 57-58 of the opinion: 
"The complaint, however, states a cause of 
action in deceit. The complaint is bottomed, 
not on breach of contract, but on misrepre-
sentation and the substitution of the corpora-
tion instead of the defendant as the one 
obligated to perform the promise made of 
payment of installments as they became due on 
the mortgage. Plaintiff relies on the rule 
that an action for fraud may be predicated on 
a promise accompanied by the present intention 
not to perform it, made for the purpose of 
deceiving the promisee, thereby inducing him 
to act where otherwise he would not have done 
so, and by virtue of which he parted with his 
money. 12 R.C.L. 261; 27 C.J. 35, see 
annotations 51 A.L.R. 46; Snyder v. City Bond 
& Finance Co., 106 Cal. App. 745, 289 P. 859. 
This rule is supported very generally and is 
said to be the majority rule. The theory on 
which it is based is well stated in 12 R.C.L. 
262, as follows: 
'The rule is based on the theory that 
one who promises another to do something in 
the future as a consideration or inducement 
to him to do anything, impliedly asserts a 
present intent to carry out his promise; that 
the intention to deceive is a condition of 
mind, which, when it exists, is as much a 
fact as is a condition of the body, not-
withstanding that it is more difficult to 
prove; and that, therefore a misstatement of 
a man's mind is a misstatement of fact. The 
gist of the fraud, in such cases, is not the 
breach of a promise, but the fraudulent 
intent of the promisor or obligor at the time 
he makes the promise or executed the contract, 
not to perform the same, and to deceive the 
obligee by his false promise. Hence to 
render nonperformance fraudulent the intention 
not to perform must exist when the promise is 
made, and if the promise is made in good 
faith when the contract is entered into there 
is no fraud though the promisor subsequently 
changes his mind and fails or refuses to 
perform.' 
-9-
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"Some courts, a numerical minority, hold 
that fraud cannot be predicated on a mere 
promise, even though accompanied by a present 
intention not to perform, on the ground that 
ev2n under such circumstances t~e promise is 
not the misrepresentation of an existing 
fact. Where the minority rule is followed, 
it is held that the remedy in sue~ case, !f 
any, is to sue upon the promise. 12 R.C.L. 
262. ,Je are inclined to follow the majority 
rule and hold the complaint states a cause of 
action for misrepresentation of a fact, in 
that the allegation is that defendant made 
the promise to pay the mortgage and to post 
as security $3,500 of bonds of the General 
Finance Company, and at the time he had no 
present intention of keeping his promise, 
because he at once drew a contract in writing, 
which plaintiff says he did not and could not 
read and did not agree to, wherein the 
obligations defendant had promised to assume 
were shifted to the corporation of which he 
was an officer, and, instead of bonds, mere 
stock of the company was posted as security." 
Appellant's complaint does not allege that when the claimed 
misrepresentation was made by respondent that it would develop 
the property it was acquiring from appellant as a park, it was 
respondent's intention at that time not to perform and not to 
develop the property as a park. It always was and still is 
respondent's intention to develop the property as a park. The 
property will be fully developed as part of the Big Cottonwood 
Park as soon as funds are available. The so-called promissory 
misrepresentation alleged by appellant in its complaint simply 
doesn't meet the criteria for an actionable misrepresentation 
established by Hull v. Flinders, supra, which has never been 
repealed. 
-10-
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I 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BECAUSE THE 
PROPERTY RESPONDENT ACQUIRED FROM APPELLANT 
HAS NOT BEEN FULLY DEVELOPED AS A PARK IS 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
In support of its Point 3 about being entitled to damages, 
appellant reiterates and reaffirms the only claim it makes 
against respondent, i.e., a so-called promissory misrepresentation 
by stating in the concluding paragraph for that point on page 8 
of its brief: 
"The Corporation is, therefore, entitled to 
damages incurred in detrimentally relying on 
the County's promised development .... " 
(Emphasis supplied) 
At no time has appellant ever alleged that at the time the 
promise was made it was the intention of respondent not to 
perform. As this court said in Hull v. Flinders, supra, on page 
55: 
" ... To render nonperformance fraudulent the 
intention not to perform must exist when the 
promise is made, and if the promise is made 
in good faith when the contract is entered 
into there is no fraud though the promisor 
subsequently changes his mind and fails or 
refuses to perform." 
See also 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec. 85, at page 130: 
"No charge of fraud will lie where the 
intended use of the property is stated in 
good faith, but the purchaser afterward 
changes his mind .... " 
Respondent has not changed its mind. The property will in fact 
be developed as soon as funds are available. 
In the case of Olsen v. Bd. of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist., 
571 P.2d 1336, condemnation proceedings were initiated in 1964 to 
L -11-
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acquire certain property for the construction of school buildinr, 
A judgment of condemnation was entered in 1966. However, the 
property was never put to its intended use. In 1966 it was 
declared surplus and sold. Although an effort was made to have 
the condemnation declared void or voidable because the acquired 
property was never put to its intended use, the condemnation by 
which the school district originally acquired the property was 
nevertheless upheld. 
Finally, appellant, to support Point III in its brief that 
it is entitled to damages because it justifiably relied on 
respondent's promised performance to develop the acquired propen: j 
as a park, asserts on page 5: 
" ... Failure to carry out the promised develop-
ment constituted a 'second taking' for which 
the County must pay adequate consideration." 1 
Appellant then cites the Alaska cases of Alsop v. State, 586 P.2d ! 
1236, and Grant v. State, 560 P.2d 36 in support thereof. 
Neither of those cases is in point. 
The Alsop case was an attempted class action case for 
declaratory relief. Alsop's property had been condemned in a 
prior condemnation proceeding as part of the proposed New Seward 
I 
Highway. He had expressly conditioned the settlement of his 
condemnation case on the continuation of unrestricted access to I 
that highway at the 76th Avenue intersection. A subsequent plan ) 
for upgrading the highway, among other things, called for closure I 
of the 76th Avenue intersection. I 
While the Alaska Supreme Court held that a class action was 
1
1 
not proper, it did say in part in its opinion at page 1240: 
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"We hold that in order to recover damages, 
each of the appellants must demonstrate that 
he or a predecessor in interest had a portion 
of his property taken for the original 
construction project, that he or his pre-
decessor relied on construction of an inter-
section at ?6th Avenue or the two-way frontage 
road, or both, in settling or receiving an 
award for their condemnation claims, and that 
his remaining property has decreased in value 
as a result of the highway modification." 
The Grant case, like the Alsop case, concerned a deprivation 
of access because of a change in highway construction plans. In 
i~ovember of 1972, Grant's prior owner of the property, Mathis, 
along with eight others, sued the State of Alaska in inverse 
condemnation for purported deprivation of access to adjacent 
property. A month thereafter Mathis sold the property to Grant, 
reserving its inverse condemnation claim against the State. In 
1972, at the time of the conveyance from Mathis to Grant, the 
State's highway construction plans called for an underpass 
culvert which would permit ingress and egress of small craft to 
the Mathis property. During construction of the expressway in 
1974, however, the culvert collapsed and the State decided it 
would not be replaced. In March of 1975 Mathis settled its 
inverse condemnation with the State in which settlement she 
acknowledged receipt of payment of compensation for the taking of 
the water access and damages arising out of or resulting from the 
taking. After the Mathis settlement, the Grants, in October of 
1975, sued the State of Alaska in inverse condemnation asserting 
that when they purchased the property from Mathis in 1972, they 
relied on the State's plan in existence at that time to provide 
an underpass culvert directly in front of the property which 
-13-
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would provide access to the property. In that suit the lower 
court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the 
State's theory that Grant's predecessor in interest had alr~~ 
been paid for this very claim. In reversing the summary j udgr,· 
and remanding for a new trial, the Supreme Court of Alaska sai, I 
in part in its opinion at page 39: 
" ... There was a second economic interference 
when the state decided not to replace the 
collapsed culvert .... " 
The court said further at page 40: 
"In light of our reversal of the superior 
court's grant of summary judgment to the 
state, on remand the superior court should 
grant the state's motion for leave to file a 
third-party complaint or to require the 
joinder of Ms. Mathis. We believe that if 
l~. Mathis is made party to the suit, the 
state's seemingly reasonable claim that they 
compensated her for all damages to the 
subject property's littoral access can be 
properly adjudicated." 
Unlike the situation in the Alsop and Grant cases, supra, 
wherein a change in plans actually deprived the property owners 
of access to their property, the subject case involves a promis· 
sory representation of some future intended action which has no:j 
yet been fully consummated. Under the decision in Hull v. Flir.i 
such a promissory representation is not actionable. 
POINT V 
THE CAUSES OF ACTIOH WHICH APPELLAHT ASSERTS 
AGAIHST RESPONDE~lT HAVE NOT AHD DO NOT EXTEND 
THE STATUTE OF LIHITATIONS. 
In Point IV of its brief appellant argues that the causes·· 
action it asserts against respondent extend the statute of 
limitations. Appellant states in this connection on page 4: 
1 /, 
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"The contract in the case at bar was induced 
by duress and misrepresentation. In cases of 
duress and misrepresentation, the running of 
the statute of limitations may be delayed 
until discovery of the misrepresentation or 
release from the duress .... " 
Appellant fails to recognize that it did not sue respondent 
on the contract. There is no language whatsoever in the contract 
between the parties which obligates respondent to develop the 
property respondent acquired from appellant into a park. 
(R. 15-20) Appellant's claim against respondent is a tort claim 
based on duress and misrepresentation. The purported duress is 
that respondent threatened condemnation unless appellant would 
rol@tarily sell respondent the property. 
To support its contention that its claim of duress extends 
the statute of limitations, appellant cites 25 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Duress and Undue Influence, Section 28 (1966), stating that it is 
incumbent upon one from whom property has been obtained by duress 
to avoid the contract when released from the duress. Even if the 
threat of condemnation constituted duress, which it does not, how 
could appellant still be under that so-called duress after the 
contract which was purportedly induced by that duress has been 
signed? Upon the signing of the contract there would no longer 
Qe any such duress because there would be no necessity to 
continue to threaten condemnation because the object of the 
threatened condemnation would have already been achieved. In 
this case, the contract was signed more than ten years ago so 
appellant at that time was released of any so-called duress by 
'
1irtue of any threatened condemnation. The statute of limitations 
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for duress accordingly began to run at that time. Appellant's 
claim of duress at this late date is necessarily barred by the 
statute of limitations and the running of that statute has not 
been extended. 
To support its contention that its cause of action for 
misrepresentation has been extended, appellant cites 
51 Arn. Jur. 2d, Limitations of Action, Section 126 (1970), 
stating that a right of action on a contract does not accrue, 
and, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the 
contract is to be performed. The perforrnance set forth in the 
contract between the parties is not the development of a parkk 
the conveyance of property upon the payment of the agreed upon 
consideration. In this case, both parties fully performed 
precisely as their contract obligated them to do. Respondent 
paid and appellant conveyed. 
Appellant's cause of action for a purported promissory 
misrepresentation is a tort claim and not a contract claim. Thi 
kind of so-called promissory misrepresentation which appellant 
sets forth as its cause of action against respondent is not u 
actionable misrepresentation under the circumstances of this 
case. This has been fully treated in respondent's Point III sc 
the argument thereon will not be repeated here. 
Appellant simply does not have a cause of action against 
respondent for misrepresentation so its claimed cause of actior. 
for misrepresentation does not extend the statute of limitatioc 1 
I 
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POINT VI 
RESPONDENT CONCEDES THAT CAUSES OF ACTION 
BASED ON DURESS AND HISREPRESENTATION DO NOT 
VIOLATE THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
Appellant's Point Vis that its causes of action do not 
v~late the parol evidence rule. In support of this assertion 
~pellant states on page 10 of its brief that: 
"In the instant case, the Corporation's cause 
of action is not based on the interpretation 
of the written contract, but is based on 
matters of misrepresentation and duress .... " 
The above statement seems inconsistent with appellant's prior 
statement supporting its Point I when on page 4 of its brief it 
said: 
"The Corporation's cause of action does, 
therefore, arise out of a contractual 
right .... " 
In spite of the apparent inconsistency in appellant's 
assertions, since there is no question but that the causes of 
action against respondent are based on duress and misrepresen-
tation, it is not necessary for respondent to respond to 
appellant's Point V. Respondent concedes that causes of action 
based on duress and misrepresentation do not violate the parol 
evidence rule. 
POINT VII 
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE NOT 
BEEH IMPAIRED. APPELLANT WAS PAID JUST 
COMPENSATION FOR ITS PROPERTY WHICH WAS 
ACQUIRED BY RESPONDENT. 
1i
1 
In support of its Point VI appellant makes the statement on 
I page 11 of its brief that: 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"The Corporation's constitutional rights have 
been violated because just compensation has 
not been tendered for the Corporation's 
property .... " 
Both Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States 
and Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of the State of 
r 
Utah mandate that private property shall not be taken for public 
use without the payment of just compensation. Appellant was pai: t 
just compensation. The contract for the sale and purchase of thE 
property was voluntarily entered into by the parties. The 
consideration provided for therein was timely paid and accepted 
Thereafter, a deed of conveyance was duly executed, delivered ani' 
recorded. There is no merit to appellant's assertion that just 
compensation was not tendered for its property. 
CONCLUSION 
Giving careful consideration to all the facts set forth in 
the pleadings as well as all reasonable inferences which may be 
derived therefrom, and, applying the prevailing Utah law thereto. 
the dismissal of appellant's complaint by the lower court was 
proper and should accordingly be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TED CANNON 
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-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
